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The increasing control of the unemployed observed since the late 1990s in Western countries 
raises  two  questions.  How  did  control,  both  a  long-time  practice  and  a  marginal  one  in 
employment  policies,  become  a  major  issue?  Why  do  national  policies  on  employment 
benefits converge on the issue, even though the EU has no direct competences in the matter? 
Three levels of analysis are explored in order to answer these questions. First, the historical 
evolutions  that  have  affected  unemployment  and  its  public  treatment  are  studied,  and 
specifically  the  process  of  desobjectivation  of  unemployment  and  the  development  of 
increasingly unfavourable socio-political power relations for the unemployed. Then, the focus 
is placed on the establishment of elective affinities, in Max Weber’s meaning, between the 
active social state model promoted at supranational level and the rigorist orientations of the 
management  of  the  unemployed  at  national  level.  Eventually,  using  the  French  case,  the 
analysis of the uses of international comparisons shows how policies underpinned by national 
logics can have European tendencies that in return, they contribute to fulfil. 
 
Keywords:  Europeanisation,  active  social  state,  unemployment,  European  Employment 
Strategy, elective affinities. 
 
Résumé : 
Le renforcement du contrôle des chômeurs observable depuis la fin des années 1990 dans les 
pays d’Europe occidentale soulève deux questions. Comment le contrôle, à la fois ancien et 
traditionnellement marginal dans les politiques du chômage, a-t-il été promu comme un enjeu 
majeur ?  Pourquoi  des  politiques  nationales  d’indemnisation  du  chômage  différenciées 
convergent-elles à cet égard, alors même que l’Union européenne n’a en la matière pas de 
compétence directe ? Trois niveaux d’analyse sont esquissés pour répondre à ces questions. 
Tout d’abord, la mise en évidence des évolutions historiques qui ont affecté le chômage et son 
traitement  public,  avec  en  particulier  le  processus  de  désobjectivation  du  chômage  et 
l’instauration  de  rapports  de  force  socio-politiques  défavorables  aux  chômeurs,  que  l’on 
retrouve largement à l’échelle européenne. Ensuite l’établissement d’affinités électives, au 
sens de Max Weber, entre le modèle de l’Etat social actif promu au plan supranational, et les 
orientations rigoristes du traitement des chômeurs au plan national. Enfin l’analyse, à partir du 
cas  français,  des  usages  du  comparatisme  international,  montre  comment  des  politiques 
obéissant à des logiques nationales peuvent s’autoriser de tendances européennes qu’elles 
contribuent en retour à réaliser. 
 
Mots-clés : Européanisation, Etat social actif, Chômage, Contrôle, Stratégie européenne pour 
l’emploi, Affinités électives.  
GSPE Working Papers – Vincent DUBOIS – 5/5/2009  2
Europeanisation through elective affinities: 




Vincent Dubois vincent.dubois@misha.fr 
Professor – Centre for European Political Sociology (GSPE) 





Control  of  unemployed  people  can  be 
defined as the set of institutional practices 
for  checking  their  condition,  especially 
their actual “willingness” to find or return 
to  work.  Generally  linked  to 
unemployment  benefits  procedures,  these 
practices lead to punitive measures being 
taken  against  those  whose  behaviour  is 
considered  to  be  fraudulent,  abusive  and 
more  generally  at  variance  with  the 
variable-system, the social responsibilities 
expected from them. This test is as old as 
the unemployment benefits “invention” as 
a  category  of  public  action.  In  late 
nineteenth  century  France,  trade  union 
unemployment  funds  were  already 
subjecting  unemployed  workers  to  close 
scrutiny  in  order  to  determine  if  they 
“deserved”  assistance  and,  if  need  be, 
eliminate  the  “parasites”  perceived  as 
deviant  elements  (mostly  alcoholics)  or 
whose efforts at finding jobs were judged 
to be insufficient (Salais et al. 1986; Daniel 
and Tuchszirer 1999). During the 1930s in 
England,  the  means  tests  consisted  in 
systematic  surveillance  of  the  living 
conditions of people receiving unemployed 
benefits.  Georges  Orwell  provides  an 
example  of  this  painful  phenomenon 
(Orwell 1989). Additional examples can be 
found in other European countries from as 
early as before the Second World War and 
the  gradual  unification  of  national 
unemployment benefits systems. 
Control  practices  are  therefore 
anything  but  new.  Their  importance  and 
significance  have  however  increased 
considerably  all  over  Europe  since  the 
mid-nineteen-nineties,  first,  in  Great 
Britain  following  the  1996  Job  Seeker’s 
Act, then in the Netherlands especially, in 
Belgium, Germany, Greece and France. Of 
course,  imprecations  against  “fake 
unemployed  people”  have  always  been 
routine  features  of  political  and  media 
debates  as  well  as  of  ordinary 
conversations  on  the  subject  of 
unemployment  and  attendant  benefits. 
However, it is only from this period that 
the  control  of  “fake  unemployed  people” 
became  the  subject  of  public  controversy 
both  in  the  media  (where  there  are 
countless  articles  and  reports  on  the 
subject) and in political arenas. Although 
the concerned bodies have for a long time 
mounted  surveillance  that  is  sometimes 
simply  coercive,  these  practices  had 
hitherto not attracted the investments that 
made  them  the  axis  of  a  “policy”  – 
intellectual  investments  in  the  production 
of legal, economic or managerial expertise; 
technical investments in computer systems; 
human investments in training controllers; 
political  and  institutional  investments  in 
drawing  up  new  rules,  creation  of  new 
arrangements or the reorganisation of inter-
actor  relations.  Although  the  punitive 
measures that may result from the controls 
had  already  constituted  an  “adjustment 
variable” that helped to artificially reduce 
“unemployment  figures”  (Mathiot 2001;  
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Pierru 2003), they had never been designed 
and considered (not even in its tone-down 
“monitoring”  form  or  “support”  for 
unemployed  people)  as  an  instrument  of 
these  policies.  More  than  mere 
bureaucratic scrutiny of the compliance of 
dossiers or the management checks on the 
regularity of payments, control has in fact 
emerged  as  a  means  of  influencing  the 
personal behaviour of unemployed people, 
which is now known to be one of the major 
causes of unemployment. 
This  trend  is  generally  observed  in  the 
European Union (EU) and in most Western 
countries  (Dufour  et  al.  2003).  However, 
the seeming convergence is by no means 
obvious,  first,  because  unemployment 
benefit systems remain very differentiated 
at the national level, both in terms of their 
institutional  organisation  and  their 
financing and benefits payment conditions. 
Also,  as  far  Europe  is  concerned,  the 
modalities  for  paying  unemployment 
benefits  and  a  fortiori  for  controlling 
unemployed  people  are  strictly  national 
jurisdictions  not  subject  to  direct 
Community  intervention.  Although  there 
are  clear  similarities,  they  are  not 
comparable  to  “Europeanisation” 
understood  as  the  effect  of  supranational 
injunctions. 
Consequently, this article raises two 
issues:  how  did  control,  an  old  and 
traditionally  marginal  element  of 
unemployment  policies,  become  a  major 
stake?  Why  do  differentiated  and 
independent  national  unemployment 
benefits policies converge in this respect? 
In  order  to  provide  answers  to  these 
questions,  we  would  first  of  all  take  a 
second look at the major historic changes 
that  shaped  unemployment  and  the 
conditions  of  its  public  treatment.  The 
process of disobjectivating unemployment 
and  the  establishment  of  a  socio-political 
balance  of  power  unfavourable  to 
unemployed  people,  both  of  which  are 
observed  on  the  European  scale,  provide 
inkling  to  the  rise  of  control  policies;  in 
these  conditions,  political  orientations 
conceived at the supranational level, which 
are  conducive  to  the  strengthening  of 
control  without  necessarily  enjoining  it 
directly,  found  an  echo  as  we  shall  see 
later. Finally, the case of France will help 
show  how  drawing  up  a  control  policy 
conform  above  all  to  national  logics, 
concretises the European trends to whose 
definition it thereby contributes. 
 
 
I - Control in the socio-historical 
transformations of unemployment 
and its public treatment. 
 
To begin, we would like to advance a few 
general hypotheses in relation to the stakes 
involved  in  control  practices  and  the 
changes  which  may  have  led,  at  least 
during the last decade, to it being accorded 
unusual  importance  in  terms  of 
unemployment  policies.  We  are  thus 
initiating an analysis of the convergence of 
national  unemployment  policies  which 
explore  the  history  of  national  structural 
transformations  of  this  phenomenon  and 
the  conditions  of  its  public  treatment
1 
before possibly imputing it, as is often the 
case, to the dissemination of norms enacted 
at  the  European  level  or  for  purposes  of 
“learning”  and  “imitation”  following  the 




The meaning(s) of control 
 
In order to better grasp the scope of control 
in unemployment policies, and to provide a 
first  historical  and  international  basis  for 
this comparison, we might try identifying 
the major stakes which confer sociological 
                                                 
1 Here, one must draw from a comparative social 
and political history of unemployment in order to 
go beyond these policy proposals, which is clearly 
outside the purview of this article. 
2 From a very abundant literature, cf. Featherstone 
and Radaelli 2003.  
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significance on these practices. There are 
six in all:
3 
a. Control is not limited to a formal 
procedure for checking (identity and length 
of contribution). It also includes deciding 
on  the  personal  situations  in  relation  to 
employment.  Even  before  the  issue  of 
benefits the stake of control hinges on the 
recognition, or otherwise, of the status of 
the  unemployed  person.    It  therefore 
constitutes a moment of crystallisation and 
actualisation for a historically variable and 
eminently complex social definition of the 
unemployed person. Beyond their technical 
aspects,  the  changes  and  incertitude  of 
control thus reflects those of the definition 
of  the  unemployed  person,  a  persistent 
issue since the beginning of unemployment 
history. 
b.  Similarly,  control  is  a  form  of 
“institution  rite”  (Bourdieu  1982), 
understood as a relationship of domination 
during  which  nomination  power  is 
exercised – the officials mandated by the 
institutions  and  given  the  prerogative  of 
sanction  grant  (or  refuse)  the  status  of 
unemployed person to individuals (who are 
most often impoverished) thus authorising 
them to (or not to) define themselves based 
on this status. In this regard, mechanisms 
of  control  contribute  to  the  practical 
operation of “the institution of unemployed 
people”  (Salais  et  al.  1986),  that  is,  the 
application  of  an  abstract  notion  to  real 
situations  and  persons,  which  generally 
leads to the individual interiorisation of a 
social  definition  (believing  oneself  to  be 
unemployed)  and  the  exteriorisation  of 
one’s defining characteristics (behaving as 
such). 
c.  It  is  thus  clear  why  control 
practices  shape  the  behaviours  which 
                                                 
3  This  ideal-typical  and  necessarily  rapid 
presentation does not presuppose identical modes of 
fighting  unemployment,  which  must obviously be 
distinguished  according  to  historical  and  national 
situations, especially according whether the benefits 
system is more or less insurancial or assistancial. 
define  the  condition  of  the  unemployed 
person especially as they consist in face-to-
face  relations  in  which  institutional 
injunctions  are  expressed.  More 
importantly, to the extent that the official 
definition  of  actualised  in  control 
procedures  carry  “institutionalised 
anticipations”,
4  based  on  a  balance  of 
power which helps confer a certain level of 
efficiency  to  these  prescriptions,  control 
and  any  possible  punitive  measures 
constitute an instrument of “government of 
conducts” of unemployed people (Foucault 
1994).
5 
d.  Reciprocally,  given  that  control 
is  most  often  linked  to  the  awarding  of 
public assistance to unemployed people by 
way of benefits and assistance for placing 
(Daniel  and  Tuchszirer  1999),  it  is  about 
society’s  obligations  to  unemployed 
people.  A  meeting  point  between  “rights 
and responsibilities”, it touches on a moral 
issue not only from the perspective of the 
unemployed people’s obligations but also 
from the angle of legitimate motives which 
push people to come to their aid: facilitate 
mobility, help the impoverished, encourage 
job search, incentivise or compel return to 
work, etc. these value systems are actually 
debated,  (re)affirmed,  objectivated  or  at 
least implicitly captured in control policies, 
including even the most technical aspects. 
Finally,  in  a  context  of  mass 
unemployment, control is about pragmatic 
stakes which are much more immediately 
perceptible. 
e.  Because  it  renders  operational 
the distinction between “true” and “fake” 
unemployed  people,  thus  drawing  up  the 
list of those officially recognised as such 
and  repudiating  those  are  not,  excluding 
more or less severely those whose situation 
is  considered  to  at  variance  with 
                                                 
4 Involving behavioural and/or moral expectations 
(Herzlich 1970). 
5 It is in this regard that control and (in institutional 
terms)  “social  control”  (in  sociological  terms) 
assume the same meaning.  
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institutional  expectations,  control  goes 
hand  in  glove  with  the  official  count  of 
unemployed people. As the main statistical 
source  provided  by  employment 
administrations  (National  Employment 
Office  and  the  Ministry  of  Labour  in 
France),  it  is  particularly  sensitive  to 
administrative practices and their changes. 
Thus  control  of  unemployed  people 
participates in the production of an element 
on  which  public  attention  is  focused, 
namely the unemployment rate. 
f. Finally, the more or less greater 
severity of control undoubtedly has major 
financial  implications  not  only  for  the 
interested  parties  but  also  for  the 
management of benefits funds, given that 
exclusion  from  the  status  of  unemployed 
person  brings  about  the  withdrawal  of 
related  benefits.  It  is  a  particularly 
sensitive  issue  at  a  time  when,  as  is  the 
case now, unemployment insurance funds 
are  significantly  in  deficit.  Arguments 
based on morality (references to the duties 
of the unemployed, punishing the “bad” in 
order  to  better  help  the  “good”), 
pragmatism  (encourage  job  creation)  or 
politics  (maintain  the  citizens’  support  to 
the  insurance  system)  are  very  often 
articulated together, and are also combined 
with  managerial  approaches,  which 
consider  control  and  punishment  for 
“borderline”  cases  or  “abusive  practices” 
as a way of cutting benefits expenditure. 
Although  control  is  at  the 
crossroads of multiple stakes, its intensity 
and  modalities  are  dictated  by  the 
transformations  occurring  in 
unemployment policies. 
 
Historically variable significance and 
scope 
 
Three  features  corresponding  to  three 
major  phases  are  observed.  The  issue  of 
control  assumed  particular  importance 
from  the  late  nineteenth  century  to  the 
wake of the Second World War, a period 
over  which  the  category  of  unemployed 
persons was defined in correlation with the 
institution  of  unemployment  benefits. 
Control, a sign of the narrowing definition 
of unemployment, contributed to the non-
linear objectivation of this category (Salais 
et  al.  1986:  115;  Topalov  1994).  It  also 
constituted an important point of focus of 
the debates on the building of a system of 
assistance to unemployed people. The fear 
of fraud, the consequence of difficulties in 
identifying “true” unemployed people, led 
to  the  reflections  on  desirable  modalities 
for  fighting  unemployment  being 
structured - Assistance through work, aid 
in  cash  and  in  kind  and  later 
unemployment benefits through public aid 
(Guitton 1994). The issue was all the more 
pressing as, as in 1930, the rising number 
of  unemployed  people  was  seen  as  a 
“threat” to be averted (Pierru 2003). 
On the other hand, control tends to 
be confined to a problem of administrative 
organisation  when,  as  in  the  mid-1970s, 
improvements in the job market not only 
brought about a fall in unemployment but 
also  stabilises  its  definition  and  benefits 
modes.  In  that  case,  unemployment 
becomes less of a stake, given that in any 
case it is viewed as a condition of workers 
mobility.  The  objective  situations  of 
unemployed people also easily correspond 
with  the  “workers  who  are  involuntarily 
and  temporarily  deprived  of  work” 
definition,  thus  brushing  aside  the 
uncertainties  of  classification  and 
suspicion of abuse or fraud. 
Control  gradually  became  a 
“sensitive  issue”  triggering  “debates  on 
principles”  with  the  stabilisation  of  mass 
unemployment from the mid-1970s. Since 
then, there has been increasing pressure to 
intensify controls. This trend is the result 
of three major distinct but interdependent 
factors.  The  combined  effect  of  these 
factors,  particularly  clear  from  the  early 
1990s, helped to understand how control of 
unemployed  people,  confined  to  a 
technical  or  subsidiary  level  in  other 
configurations, has since become an issue  
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central  to  employment  policies.  The  fact 
that the phenomenon is found in European 
countries provides preliminary insight as to 
the  reasons  of  their  convergence.  At  the 
same time, the reasons accounting for the 
differences  in  the  policies  of  the  various 
nations are explained, in the first analysis, 
by  variations  in  the  rhythm,  chronology 
and the intensity of these changes. 
In the first place, the degradation of 
the  employment  market  coupled  with  the 
diversification of “modes of employment” 
(such  as  temporary  work  or  part-time 
work)  has  increased  the  intermediary 
situations  between  employment  and 
unemployment. The collapse of the notion 
of  employment,  which  underlies  the 
definition  of  unemployment,  renders  the 
latter  hazy  or  even  leads  to  its 
“dislocation”  (Demazière  2003: 77; 
Maruani 2002: 31).  The consequences of 
the  objective  transformations  of 
employment  on  the  crumbling  of 
unemployment
6  were  worsened  by  the 
growing  influence  of  certain  scholarly 
representations  of  work  economy  which 
operated  a  veritable  “deconstruction”  of 
unemployment (Gautié 2002). The success 
of  notions  such  as  “unemployability”, 
disseminated and promoted internationally 
as  the  bedrock  of  employment  policies 
(Ebersold 2001) and, last but not least, the 
increasing  modes  of  unemployment 
benefits fall under this process. If control 
of  unemployed  people  has  come  to  be 
considered  as  increasingly  “necessary”,  it 
is mostly because of growing doubts as to 
the  definition  of  who  an  unemployed 
person really is. 
                                                 
6 Here are some examples in France: differentiation 
of  the  benefits  sector  in  1982,  separation  of 
insurance  and  solidarity  regimes  in  1984, 
introduction of minimum welfare payment in 1988 
–  which  quickly  became  an  alternative  form  of 
paying  unemployment  benefits  –  increase  (from 
five to eight) in the number of categories of end-of 
month  job-seekers  (from  five  to  eight)  in  May 
1994. 
Secondly,  the  prioritisation  of 
unemployment can be understood only in 
the light of the modifications made to the 
logics and constraints guiding employment 
policies.  We  would  recall  here  two  key 
aspects  which,  once  again,  are  largely 
shared  in  Europe  for  some  fifteen  years 
now.  The  first  has  to  do  with  the  urgent 
need to keep the lid on public expenditure 
which  translated  to  a  near-continuous 
reduction in unemployment benefits started 
in  the  early  1980s  and  accelerated  the 
following decade (Barbier et Théret 2004; 
Daniel  and  Tuchszirer  1999).  The 
stiffening  of  the  conditions  for  obtaining 
allocations,  the  introduction  of  more 
requirements to be met by recipients and, 
in the same vein, more stringent checks on 
their situation and practices were the by-
products  of  the  policy  of  expenditure 
control as the corner-stone of employment 
and social policies. Limited unemployment 
cover  is  by  the  way  linked  to  the 
transformation  in  unemployment  policies 
increasingly  aimed  at  return  to  work.  In 
this regard, the tightening of control, like 
the  reduction  in  benefits,  was  viewed  as 
“incentive to employment”. In other words, 
it  is  a  means  of  curbing  the  supposedly 
“disincentivising”  effects  of  an 
“overgenerous” benefits scheme (DARES, 
2003).  Cuts  in  expenditure  and 
“activation”  policy  obviously  do  not 
exhaust  the  recent  orientations  of 
employment  policies  although  they 
constitute  their  salient  dimensions.  By 
encouraging cuts in public expenditure and 
dissemination  of  normative  frameworks 
(the  active  social  state,  by  linking  more 
closely link social protection and work and 
in return requiring a firmer commitment to 
return  to  work),  undeniably,  European 
integration  is  one  of  the  factors  that 
facilitated  these  trends  and  therefore 
(indirectly)  the  promotion  of  control. 
However,  it  is  only  one  among  many 
factors. 
Indeed, - and this is the third point 
– changes in the balance of power at the  
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national  level  have  undoubtedly  gained 
influence given that national socio-political 
configurations  have  favoured  greater 
“rigour” in the processing of unemployed 
people. It should be recalled that “social” 
trends  have  lost  ground  to  “liberal” 
orientations among the political elite who 
are critical of the “unwanted effects” of the 
Welfare  State,  as  exemplified  by  the 
changes undergone by socialist and social-
democrat parties. A counterpart movement 
is  found  at  the  peak  of  administrations, 
which  benefits  “managers”  (Hassenteufel
 
et  al.  1999;  Mathiot  2001).  It  is  equally 
worth  noting  that  negotiations  between 
“management  and  labour”  tend  to  favour 
employers – who are generally minded to 
pay lower unemployment benefits - to the 
detriment  of  workers’  unions,  which 
incidentally have shown little commitment 
to the cause of unemployed people (Pierru 
2003). All these elements are conducive to 
the  dissemination  of  negative 
representations of unemployed people and 
the execution of policies aimed at reducing 
their  benefits  while  at  the  same  time 
increasing  the  number  of  constraints 
working  against  them.  The  tightening  of 
control is the direct result of such political 
representations and orientations. 
Consequently, one understands that 
today, this tightening is not merely a return 
to the time when institutional checks on the 
situations  and  behaviours  of  aspirants  to 
the status of unemployed persons was an 
integral part of the gradual stabilisation of 
the unemployment category and the paying 
of its benefits. One can even advance the 
hypothesis that the current prominence of 
the  issue  falls  within  an  inverse  process. 
Indeed,  while  the  importance  granted  to 
control  during  the  first  two  thirds  of  the 
20
th  century  was  part  of  the  process  of 
objectivating unemployment as a collective 
category,  and  the  institution  of  aide  to 
unemployed people, it corresponds on the 
contrary,  in  recent  times,  to  the 
disobjectivation  of  the  unemployment 




II - The elective affinities between 
“active social state” and control 
policies 
 
These historic landmarks must be kept in 
mind in order to grasp the scope of models 
disseminated  internationally,  especially  in 
the European Union. In the case in point, 
this  scope  cannot  be  reduced  to  merely 
transposing  onto  national  policies 
normative  frameworks  formed  at  the 
supranational  level:  the  latter  do  not 
constitute direct constraints and above all 
do  not  include  explicit  prescriptions  in 
terms of control. That is why it seems more 
judicious that we draw inspiration from the 
notion of “elective affinity” coined by Max 
Weber  (Weber  1994),  to  account  for  the 
processes  whereby  two  meaning  and 
practices  systems  meet,  converge  and 
reinforce each other. In the case in point, 
the  “active  social  State”  model  promoted 
widely  by  organisations  like  the  OECD 
and  constituted  with  reference  to  the 
harmonisation  of  social  and  employment 
policies  in  the  European  Union  –  mainly 
through  the  European  Employment 
Strategy  -  shows  certain  characteristics 
which prepare the political and intellectual 
ground for control-enhancing mechanisms. 
National  policies  cannot  be  considered 
merely  as  applications  of  this  model  or 
even simply assimilated to the effects of its 
dissemination. They can be inspired from 
them but they have sometimes preceded its 
adoption by the EU (as is the case of Great 
Britain  or  Belgium).  On  the  other  hand, 
there are elements in this model which help 
refer  control  policies  to  desirable 
objectives,  give  meaning  to  the  resulting 
practices  and  legitimise  highly 
controversial orientations such that control 
of  unemployed  people  is  no  longer 
“hunting  down  poor  people”  but  fighting  
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the  “unwanted  effects”  of  the  “Classic 
State”  and  working  for  the  “return  to 
employment” by  “supporting unemployed 
people”. 
 
Some characteristics of an international 
social policy and employment model 
 
The  oft-repeated  precepts  in  countless 
reports, resolutions and other institutional 
productions  tracing  the  contours  of  this 
model  can  be  categorised  according  to 
three  main  points.  The  first  is  the 
development of work. “Making work pay” 
has  thus  been  one  of  the  slogans  of  the 
OECD  since  the  mid-1980s  as  shown  by 
the frequency of editorials devoted to this 
theme  in  the  Employment  Outlook  series 
published  annually  by  the  organisation: 
“Activity  for  all  in  tomorrow’s  society” 
(1987); “Steps towards an active society” 
(1988);  “The  path  to  full  employment: 
structural adjustment for an active society” 
(1989); “Rewarding work” (2000) (see Mc 
Bride  and  Williams  2001).  The  same 
leitmotiv  is  found  in  European 
Commission documents, particularly since 
the creation of the European Employment 
Strategy  (EES)  in  1997.
7  If  the  slogan 
making work pay helps “to strengthen the 
incentives to work”, it also encourages, on 
the  downside,  to  render  less  “attractive” 
the  mechanisms  of  assistance  and  social 
protection by tightening the conditions for 
access,  reducing  the  benefits  period, 
demanding  commitment  in  return  and 
tightening of controls. All these measures 
constitute  practical  “solutions”  which 
logically  extend  the  principle  of 
“rewarding work”. 
The result is criticism levelled against the 
so-called “passive” expenditures. Indeed, it 
is  in  this  framework  that  the  relationship 
between labour market policies and social 
policies  are  defined  (OECD,  1991,  1992, 
                                                 
7 For an overall view, cf. Barbier and Sylla 2004; de 
la Porte and Pochet 2004 and the contribution of 
Bernard Conter in this edition. 
1993,  1994,  1995).  Among  many  other 
similar positions taken, a Communication 
from  the  European  Commission  in  July 
1999, taken up by the Conclusions of the 
Council  in  December  1999,  underscored 
on  its  part  that  “the  new  labour  market 
called  for  more  than  simply  providing 
traditional  forms  of  protection  like  the 
guarantee  of  a  replacement  income”  and 
drew  attention  to  the  “need  for  a  new 
balance between flexibility and security, as 
well  as  between  rights  and 
responsibilities”.
8 
The  accusations  of  “laxity”  and  “abuses” 
levelled against the grant allocation system 
should be seen from the viewpoint of this 
legitimisation,  thereby  conferring,  once 
again, (positive) value to the tightening of 
control. More explicitly, a communication 
from  the  European  Commission  on 
December  23  cited  unemployment 
insurance benefits as one of the “obstacles 
to  integration  on  the  labour  market”, 
arguing  that  “unemployment  benefits  can 
create  counter-incentives  to  work  since 
they  are paid over  a long period and are 
neither  monitored  nor  controlled 
adequately  through  clear  requirements  in 
terms  of  active  job  search,  professional 
tests  and  participation  in  active 
measurements on the labour market”.
9 
The  discourse  on  the  presumed 
dead-end  in  which  the  “passive  Social 
State” finds  itself  hinges  in  fact  on  a 
utilitarian  concept  of  the  behaviour  of 
“assisted  persons”.  Proceeding  from  the 
axiom  of  a  rational  unemployed  person 
who calculates their work utility function, 
“eliminating  inactivity”  is  one  of  the 
“major  challenges”  to  “mobilising 
                                                 
8 The Social Protection Committee, Key Issues on 
Social Protection and Employment, 1999 (Revised 
Version - June 2003). 
9 Communication from the Commission to Council, 
the  European  parliament,  to  the  European 
Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the 
Committee  of  the  Regions,  Modernising  social 
protection for more quality jobs: A general strategy 
for making work pay, 2003  
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manpower” (OECD, 2003). Joint action is 
therefore desirable in terms of the amount 
of  money,  the  duration  and  access 
conditions  but  also  tightening  of  control 
given  that  the  form  of  reasoning  that 
portrays unemployed persons as seeking to 
maximise  their  interest  logically  depicts 
them as potential “profiteers” (Cordonnier 
2000).  These  institutional  prescriptions
10 
echo a set of economic theories which tend 
to highlight the  “incentivising virtues” of 
control  and  sanctions  on  return  to 
employment.
11 
The  three  characteristic  principles 
recapped above were widely disseminated 
internationally.  They served especially as 
the  basis  for  discussing  employment 
policies  in  the  EU  and  drew  up  a  set  of 
proposals  defining  what  a  model  is. 
Clearly,  the  latter  help  consider  the 
tightening of control as a desirable practice 
in terms of national employment policies. 
 
The ambiguous role of the European 
Employment Strategy 
 
The European Employment Strategy (EES) 
is undoubtedly one of the major occasions 
for  encounter  between  this  European 
“model”  and  national  policies.  The  now 
numerous  analyses  have  brought  to  the 
fore the specificities of the Europeanisation 
of national policies in the framework of the 
Open  Method  of  Coordination  (OMC)  of 
which EES was the first major application 
(de  la  Porte  and  Pochet  2004).  Based  on 
benchmarking  practices  that  presupposed 
the  definition  of  shared  indicators  for 
identifying “good practices” (Salais 2004) 
whose harmonisation lays the groundwork 
for  “guidelines”  serving  as  reference  to 
                                                 
10 Of course, one should identify differences of time 
and  nuance  in  terms  of  approach  –  OCDE  and 
European  Commission  orientation  cannot  entirely 
be identical – and better analyse the representation 
system and the reasoning at work. 
11  For  examples  of  this,  see  our  aforementioned 
report (Dubois 2006). 
“national employment action plans” drawn 
up  by  member  States  and  subsequently 
synthesised by the European Commission 
and  the  Commissioner  for  Social  Affairs 
and employment, this strategy is contrary 
to  the  usual  module  of  “vertical”  and 
“horizontal”  process  of  Europeanisation. 
We would like to show here, in the specific 
case of control of unemployed persons, a 
general  orientation  defined  through 
multiple  European  exchanges  was 
combined  with  reform  projects  with 
pronounced national undertones. 
Undeniably,  the  EES  is  an 
important vector of Europeanisation given 
that  employment  policies,  which  are 
traditionally  conceived  and  debated  in 
national frameworks, are now placed in a 
European perspective. This is at the same 
time  an  opportunity  to  define  common 
orientations  (guidelines)  and  make 
comparisons  and  exchanges  among 
member States, which, incidentally, is how 
the  OMC  works.  The  National  Action 
Plans  for  Employment  (NAPE,  later 
known as NAP) drawn up every year thus 
constituted both reference documents at the 
national  level  and  crucial  elements  for 
linking  national  policies  to  European 
orientations. 
Control of job seekers does feature 
implicitly neither in the EES guidelines nor 
in  the  recommendations  of  Council  and 
Commission  to  national  governments. 
However, everything is done as though all 
parties  –  to  which  must  be  added  less 
visible pressures among representatives of 
member  States  (Barbier  and  Sylla,  2001: 
93) –  espoused  principles  whose 
application,  left  to  the  responsibility  of 
States,  resulted  in  control  policies. 
Reciprocity is equally true. For, although 
the logics underlying national employment 
policies envision new control policies, the 
latter  find  expression  in  the  principles 
defined in European recommendations and 
guidelines. 
A  good  example  of  this  is  France  in  the 
early 2000s. Recommendation No. 2 of the  
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2002  NAP  urges  all  “building  on  recent 
tax-benefit  reforms,  continue 
implementing  and  monitoring  the  impact 
of policy measures designed to encourage 
workers  to  seek  and  remain  in  work, 
particularly  measures  with  an  effect  on 
low-skilled and low-paid workers” notably 
by  exploiting  the  unemployment  benefits 
payment modes. The French solution is the 
following: 
 
“The  effective  elimination  of  factors 
contributing to the reluctance to resume 
employment  for  economic  reasons  has 
been a  constant  concern during  recent 
years […]. The incentive to go back to 
work or continue working, particularly 
in  the  case  of  low-paid  jobs,  is  being 
reinforced by the combination of several 
mechanisms  that  help  to  reduce 
‘unemployment  traps’  and  maximise 
income  when  individuals  find  a  job 
again.  These  measures  are 
complementary  to,  and  inseparable 
from, the more quality-oriented return-
to-employment  support  programmes.” 
(NAP 2002). 
 
The problem, though, is that these 
“quality-oriented support programmes” are 
a double-edged sword, the other side being 
job search assistance and greater control of 
the effectiveness of this action. On its part, 
the  third  recommendation  specifically 
recommends to “pursue implementation of 
personalised  and  early  intervention 
schemes for the unemployed; examine the 
effectiveness  of  and  report  on  the 
implementation of the Personalised Action 
Plans for a New Start initiative”. The 2003 
French  Government  document  directly 
reiterates this orientation, adding reform of 
the  public  employment  service.  A  year 
later, it reported the creation of a reformed 
control and penalty system. 
These measures have long been on 
the drawing board in France and have been 
the  subject  of  long-drawn  efforts  on  the 
part  of  MEDEF,  the  French  employers’ 
association. This resulted in the creation of 
the Return-to-work Assistance Action Plan 
provided  for  in  the  UNEDIC  convention 
on  unemployment  insurance  funds  which 
took  effect  from  1
st  July  2001.  The 
tightening  of  control  of  unemployed 
persons, at the behest of MEDEF and the 
trade  union  CFDT  was  originally 
subordinated  to  the  abolition  of  the 
degressive unemployment benefits system: 
unemployed people are paid better benefits 
provided  their  “efforts”  are  better 
controlled.  This  proposal  became  one  of 
the major stumbling blocks to ministerial 
approval and finally had to be abandoned 
because  of  opposition  from  Martine 
Aubury,  the  then  Minister  of  Labour 
(Dubois  2006).  The  emergence  some 
months later of various projects aimed at 
“enhancing the efficiency” with a view to 
“supporting” unemployed persons to return 
to work – and their subsequent realisation 
with the Social Cohesion Plan in 2004 – 
are more of a return to envisaged reforms 
abandoned  in  the  past  in  tandem  with 
strictly national balances of power than the 
consequence  of  the  dissemination  of 
European intervention principles.  
Similar  observations  can  be  made 
concerning  the  redefinition  of  “suitable 
employment”,  a  notion  that  is  both 
uncertain  and  strategic  in  terms  of 
employment  policy.  Coined  by  the 
International Labour Organisation in 1948, 
“suitable employment” is variously defined 
depending  on  the  country  (Freyssinet 
2000).  Its  wide  and  extensive  application 
has long been claimed employers’ bodies 
(i.e. MEDEF in France) and is in tune with 
the  desire  for  greater  European 
harmonisation/standardisation  within  the 
EES,  which  emulates  the  most  flexible 
national legislations in the matter and, by 
extension,  the  most  unfriendly  to 
unemployed persons.
12 Indeed, recognition 
                                                 
12  See  the  website  of  the  European  employment 
Observatory, which proposes summaries of national 
policies with a view to identifying “best practices ”: 
http://www.eu-employment-observatory.net  
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of  unemployed  persons’  ability  to  refuse 
employment is based on this category. The 
salary  gap  in  terms  of  previous 
employment,  appropriateness  to 
qualification  and  distance  from  home  are 
generally considered as legitimate reasons 
for  refusal.  Expanding  these  criteria  is 
tantamount to creating  more occasions to 
punish  unemployed  persons,  whose 
freedom  of  choice  in  terms  of  return  to 
employment  is  thus  restricted.  It  also 
means, as suggested earlier, that control is 
no  longer  a  means  of  checking  only  but 




III - “Others have done it” – 




Let us reconsider the hypothesis of elective 
affinity  between  employment  policies 
disseminated  at  the  European  level  and 
national  policies  which  tend  to  tighten 
control  of  unemployed  persons  by 
proceeding,  this  time  around,  from  the 
formulation  and  legitimisation  of  these 
policies.  The  case  of  France  shows  that 
these  processes,  although  shaped  by 
national  logics,  draw  from  European 
references  –  in  terms  of  the  following 
illustrations and examples – thus helping to 
consider control as a constitutive element 
of “modern” employment policies and thus 
justifying  the  reforms  which  can 
subsequently be presented as arising from 
necessity and evidence. 
In  France,  these  orientations  were 
realised  notably  in  the  provision  of  the 
Social  Cohesion  Plan  –  precision  and 
greater number of requirements to be met 
by  job-seekers  receiving  benefits,  more 
possible grounds for withholding benefits, 
hierarchise  penalties,  modification  of 
control  among  the  departmental 
directorates  of  employment,  ANPE  and 
ASSEDIC,  easy  access  to  personal 
information necessary for control.
13 Added 
to  these  is  the  introduction  of  monthly 
follow-up  of  unemployed  persons  by 
ANPE  as  well  as  measures  taken  by 
UNEDIC  to  fight  fraud  and,  more 
generally, detect unemployed persons who 
are  not  sufficiently  active  in  their  search 
for employment (Dubois 2006). 
Short of tracing the complex set of 
actors, their relationships, negotiations and 
practices  which  engendered  these  new 
control  policies,  we  proceed  from  a 
particularly  important  component  of  their 
constitution,  that  is,  the  reports  that 
prepared them. These documents constitute 
a  crucial  stage  in  the  officialisation  of 
“public  problems”  and  their  mode  of 
construction  (Lahire  1999:  81-99).  They 
equally constitute a tool for formatting and 
systemising,  if  not  producing,  “official 
thought”  (Lebaron  2001).  In  connection 
with this, they provide relevant material for 
understanding  the  logics  underlying  the 
formulation  and  legitimation  of  new 
policies. In the case in question, it is all the 
more crucial to study these reports as they 
play  a  crucial  role  in  relations  between 
European references and national policies. 
 
Unprecedented prominence of the issue 
of control 
 
The reports published in France from 2003 
are  both  the  manifestation  and  vector  of 
new  public  interest,  in  its  form  and 
intensity in control of unemployed persons. 
The  issues  generally  appear  in  a  diffuse 
manner.  Indeed,  it  is  possible  to  make 
many entries under this protean problem – 
                                                 
13  Cf.  Act  n°2005-32  of  18th  January  2005  on 
programming for social cohesion, notably Articles 
11 and 12 of Section IV on “return-to-employment 
assistance  for  unemployed  workers”  decrees 
n°2005-915 of 2
nd August 2005 and n°2005-1624 of 
22nd December 2005 on follow-up on job search ; 
circular  of  the  Ministry  of  Labour  of  19th 
September 2005.  
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the  relations  among  the  various  public 
employment  services,  to  official 
unemployment figures through the causes 
of unemployment and even the behaviour 
of  unemployed  persons.  Although  often 
present, these stakes were for a long were 
not the subject of unified processing. 
As in the area of social benefits and 
assistance (Dubois 2003), the first traces of 
significant  politico-administrative 
investment  in  control  dates  back  to  the 
early  nineteen  nineties,  notably  with  the 
report  from  the  Social  Affairs  Inspection 
General (1990). This interest subsequently 
intensified  in  2003  as  is  shown  by  the 
publication  in  a  matter  of  months  of  at 
least  four  official  reports.  These  are,  in 
chronological  order,  the  chapter  of  the 
government Accounting Office 2003 report 
dealing  with  control  of  job  search  and  a 
report  on  the  pooling  of  employment 
services  (Marimbert  2004)  sponsored  in 
anticipation  of  the  “law  on  employment 
mobilisation”  which  is  tagged  to  become 
one  of  the  aspects  of  the  2005  law  on 
social  cohesion.  A  few  months  later  in 
October  2004,  it  was  the  turn  of  a 
committee, presided by the governor of the 
Bank  of  France  and  former  Managing 
Director  of  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  Michel  Camdessus,  to  tackle  the 
same  subject,  incorporating  the  future 
“great economic choices for France”.
14 In 
December  of  the  same  year,  two 
Economists  submitted  a  report  to  the 
ministers of Economy and of Employment 
a  report  on  “professional  social  security” 
which also mentioned personalised follow-
up and control of unemployed persons in 
terms  similar  to  the  Marimbert  Report 
(Cahuc and Kramartz 2004: 45-47, 61-66).  
Although it is difficult to assess the 
actual  impact  of  such  reports  –  which 
                                                 
14  Indeed,  this  “sheds  light  on” […]  future 
economic and budgetary choices aimed at growth  
to quote the mission statement of Nicolas Sarkozy 
the then Minister for Economic Affairs, dated 17th 
May 2004. 
cannot  be  reduced  to  the  question  of 
whether  their  recommendations  are 
directly  implemented  or  not  –  it  is 
nonetheless obvious that their publication 
over a short period of time turned control 
into  a  public  problem.  By  referring 
(positively) to one another, they converge 
on  the  need  to  reconsider  the  place  of 
control  and  enhance  its  efficiency  in 
employment policies. 
The first two reports were released 
at  two  weeks  interval  (mid-January  and 
early February 2004), which attracted vast 
media  coverage  and  public  interest  given 
the  clearly  controversial  nature  of  the 
issues.  These works provided less answers 
to  pre-existing  debates  than  they 
engendered  interventions  regarding  the 
tightening  of  control,  which  is  now  an 
orientation of employment policies. In this 
regard, they play an important role in the 
formulation  and  legitimation  of  any  such 
orientation. The Marimbert Report, which 
was explicitly intended as groundwork for 
policy  and  public  employment  service 
reforms,  brought  “observations” 
(inefficiency  of  the  existing  control 
system),  practical  arguments  and 
orientations  (gradation  of  sanctions,  for 
example), which partly provided a basis for 
future  measures.  The  Government 
Accounting Office’s report played a double 
role by virtue of the publicity it received, 
and by placing control, if necessary, on the 
agenda  of  concerned  bodies  (UNEDIC, 
ANPE and the Ministry of Labour). 
 
Legitimisation through Europeanisation 
 
What these reports had in common was the 
importance  attached  to  the  “European 
dimension”.  Although  there  is  nothing 
original about this, it helps in the case in 
point  to  reinforce  control  and  sanctions 
with a generally favourable orientation. In 
fact,  it  seems  that  references  to  EU 
provisions  in  terms  of  employment  are 
quite evasive although this cannot be said 
to be surprising given the nature of these  
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policies. The European reference, and to a 
greater extent the international reference is 
much  more  marked  by  the  process  of 
compiling the reports, like those submitted 
by M. Camdessus and J. Marimbert. The 
team that participated in the writing of the 
first document was also helped by a “group 
of  European  experts”  mostly  drawn  from 
the  Commission.  As  to  the  second 
document,  it  was  the  occasion  for  an 
encounter  with  “personalities”,  including 
four  European  civil  servants  from  DG 
Employment and no less than ten experts 
and  representatives  of  bodies  from  the 
Netherlands.
15  An  essential  proportion  of 
information  provided  in  this  report  was 
sourced from the OECD surveys. 
However, it is undoubtedly by the 
mention  of  ‘experience  in  EU  countries 
that the European framing
16 is most clearly 
distinguished.  As  in  many  other  sectors, 
employment policies  for some  years now 
were  subjected  to  double  comparatist 
evidence.  First,  reference  to  what  “our 
European  neighbours”  are  doing  is  now 
inevitable.  Secondly,  this  spontaneously 
comparatist look very often based on very 
incomplete  knowledge  of  situations  in 
other countries, and on  the partial use of 
information  and  the  “lessons”  they  teach 
all provide “evidence” of choices to which 
is  attributed  the  “successes”  they  could 
have brought about in other countries.  In 
this  regard,  the  Marimbert  Report 
highlights the “best practices” –  a notion 
currently  in  vogue  –  implemented  in 
Britain,  Italy,  and  the  Netherlands  or  in 
Sweden.  It  also  provides  in  annex  the 
“foreign  experiences”  which  constitute 
proof  that  many  countries  have  already 
                                                 
15 This country was not chosen by coincidence. It is 
one of the first two countries to privatise placement 
of unemployed persons and intensify their control. 
16  In  contrast,  very  little  mention  is  made  of  the 
United States or Canada. On the other hand a few 
references are made to Australia where one of the 
earliest  “profiling”  mechanisms  was  invented  by 
the Ingeus and imported into France as part of the 
measures to “support” job-seekers. 
resorted  to  measures  aimed  at  tightening 
the rules concerning unemployed persons, 
thus  leading  to  better  results  in  terms  of 
employment.  An  instructive  example  of 
this is provided by the Camdessus Report. 
In  a  chapter  meaningfully  titled  “Others 
have done it”, public policies implemented 
by  various  countries  were  identified  as 
“good practices” to be emulated in France; 
this is the case of Denmark where positive 
results  were  obtained  thanks  to  the 
tightening of conditions for accessing the 
unemployment  insurance  fund  hand  in 
hand with reduction of the payment period 
and the obligation on unemployed persons 
to  join  return-to-work  programs  (p.  45). 
The  same  holds  for  the  British  “mode”. 
Falling  unemployment  in  Britain  is  not 
only undisputed
17 but is also attributed to 
“strong  policy  choices  by  successive 
governments  who  laid  emphasis  on  the 
indispensable  role  of  work”  (p.  46).  The 
report  emphasised  that  this  led  to  major 
changes in the public employment service. 
Thus,  “the  reform  of  the  unemployment 
insurance  fund  undertaken  in  1996 
(jobseeker’s  allowances)  led  to  the 
tightening  of  control  and  genuine  search 
for  employment  beyond  six  months. 
Payments depend on this search and on the 
resource  situation  of  the  household. 
Benefits tend to fall once income begins to 
rise. The rights and obligation in terms of 
training and job acceptance are marked by 
various  stages  corresponding  to  objective 
criteria varying with length the period of 
unemployment” (p. 46). 
Without going into the details of an 
increment based on very different registers 
(technical,  moral,  legal  and  sound 
                                                 
17 While it is a known fact that “acknowledgement” 
of  this  fall  was  based  on  questionable  data 
(increased severity of exclusions, which at the same 
time  removed  unemployed  persons  from  the 
statistical base and the list of beneficiaries) and that 
it was not related to other parameters such as the 
shrinking  workforce  –  which  expanded  in  France 
over the same period – or even the high increase in 
part-time employment.  
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judgment  as  well  as  economic  expertise 
and “matter of society”), it is obvious that 
it  these  European  situations  that  provide 
the  basis  for  re-using  the  slogans  of  the 
active  Social  State  (preference  to  work 
over assistance, elimination of obstacles to 
integration on the job market, making work 
pay, etc.). These referents – both hazy and 
hard to contest a priori - help to conceive 
and present the tightening of control as a 
desirable  option  –  also  related  to  the 
balance  of  power  at  national  level.  This 
supposedly  is  one  of  the  means  of 
“rebalancing”  the  rights  and 
responsibilities of unemployed persons as 
well  as  a  channel  for  improving  a 
placement  system  that  is  “considerably 
inefficient  in  providing  assistance  and 





One now understands better the tendency 
to tighten control of unemployed persons 
and the logics underpinning its spread. In 
the  first  place,  widely  shared  structural 
transformations  have  brought  about 
convergent  movements.  Disobjectivation 
of the unemployed category in a context of 
pronounced  economic  crisis,  new 
constraints  on  employment  policy  and 
national  socio-political  configurations 
hostile  to  the  “cause”  of  unemployed 
persons all combined in different countries 
to usher in tougher requirements vis-à-vis 
unemployed  persons.  More  stringent 
control  and  penalty  procedures  constitute 
one of the dimensions of these policies. 
Secondly,  it  was  possible  to  base 
such  policies  on  the  creation  and 
dissemination  of  an  employment  policy 
“model”  at  the  European  level  known  as 
the  Active  Social  State.  The  procedures 
whereby  such  a  model  is  promoted  – 
comparison and  “coordination” – and the 
absence  at  this  level  of  explicit 
recommendations in terms of control help 
dismiss  the  hypothesis  of  the  European 
Union  exerting  unilateral  influence  on 
national  governments  as  the  reason  for 
their  convergent  orientations.  The 
relationship  between  this  European 
orientation  and  control  policy  at  national 
level are rather to be analysed as “elective 
affinities”,  that  is,  as  the  encounter  and 
mutual  reinforcement  by  two 
political/policy  objects  each  with  own 
logics.  Thus,  when  control  policies  find 
meaning  and  legitimacy  in  the  European 
“model”, this model in turn is more than 
just an abstract incantation. 
Thirdly, it is clear from the case of 
France  that  tightening  policies  aimed  at 
controlling  unemployed  persons  could 
proceed  from  the  dissemination  of 
comparatist  evidence  made  easy  by 
Community-level  intervention  in 
employment policies. “One can no longer” 
define a policy without taking into account 
those  pertaining  in  comparable  countries. 
And once “others did it successfully”, it is 
imperative to apply the similar provisions. 
The application of this double comparatist 
evidence is still mostly dependent on local 
strategies aimed at imposing policy choices 
as being inevitable. 
Beyond the specific case of control, 
we  dare  suggest  that  linking  these  three 
levels of analysis could serve as a basis for 
a  wider  sociology  of  the  Europeanisation 
of  employment  policies.
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